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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

TYPES OF VALUE JUDGMENTS

I AM grateful to Professor Dewey for giving, in his "Valuation Judgments and Immediate Quality,"[1] such detailed attention to an article of mine,[2] and for the clarification which his paper affords of certain very important points in his theory of valuation. It is also gratifying to have Mr. Dewey's confirmation of my opinion that we are in agreement on certain essential points of an empirical approach to values—for which, indeed, my own views are so largely indebted to his. In what follows, I shall confine myself to those points on which there has been misunderstanding or disagreement.

The central issue is whether data or aspects of events that are "subjective," in the sense that they are directly accessible only to self-observation, can serve as evidence for value judgments. And more specifically, whether introspection of that phase of the value situation which is called "enjoyment" or "satisfaction" can supply evidence relevant to decisions about values. Mr. Dewey holds that it can not; my paper criticized him for this view, and advanced the thesis that it can. My position is that an adequate empiricism with regard to values must take account of such evidence; Mr. Dewey holds that such a view is incompatible with empiricism.

Bearing upon this main issue are four related points of dispute, with which I shall deal in turn:

(1) *Two meanings of the antithesis "subjective-objective."* Mr. Dewey points out that in one context I use the term "'subjective" in a sense which is not correlative with the principal use of the term "objective," so that what is subjective by one criterion can be objective by another. Such was my explicit intention. My problem is to find out why Mr. Dewey finds this procedure "disappointing" or *prima facie* paradoxical. The assumption of my paper was that of the many senses in which the antithesis "subjective-objective" is used there are two distinct senses, both of which are pertinent to a study of valuation. These two senses

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. XL (1943), pp. 309–317.

[2] "'Objectivity' in Value Judgments," this JOURNAL, Vol. XL (1943), pp. 5–14.

I shall call, in this discussion, (*a*) the logical sense, (*b*) the psychological sense.

(*a*) The logical sense. Mr. Dewey is substantially correct in stating that the primary sense of "objectivity" in my paper identifies it with "verifiability by empirical evidence." Actually and strictly, I identified objectivity with truth rather than with verifiability. I take verifiability to be a criterion (though not the sole criterion) of meaning rather than of truth. Truth is more closely related to verification than to verifiability. I identified "*known* to be true" with "verified," and thus equated for practical purposes an objective judgment with a verified judgment. But this qualification is not important for the present issue, since Mr. Dewey's definition is in the same universe of discourse as mine.

The correlative sense of the term "subjective" is "false," or (on the practical level) "unverified." With qualifications similar to those stated above, I should accept Mr. Dewey's definition of the logically subjective: "Propositions (judgments, beliefs, or whatever) are *subjective* when they are produced by causal conditions which fail to possess genuine evidential capacity and verifying power, but which nevertheless are taken at the time to possess them. . . ." His examples are beliefs of those suffering from illusions, hallucinations, and insanity.

(*b*) The psychological sense. My statement to which Mr. Dewey takes exception was: "In so far as introspection plays a part in the knowledge of qualitative satisfaction, the evidence is *in the psychological sense* 'subjective,' i.e., it is directly accessible to one observer alone." The italics were not in the original, but my clear intent was to state that "objective" (sense *a*) and "subjective" (sense *b*) were compatible predicates.[3]

I do not see anything logically or linguistically scandalous in this procedure. The antithesis "strong-weak" also has at least two senses, but it is not contradictory to assert that the same man is both physically strong and mentally weak. If there has been a confusion, then, it would seem plausible that Mr. Dewey is confused when he holds that anything which is psychologically subjective is also logically subjective.

If "subjective" (sense *b*) means that which can directly be observed only through introspection, and thus is directly accessible to one observer alone, then "objective" in a correlative sense means

[3] Strictly speaking, the terms in sense *a* apply to propositions, and in sense *b* primarily to data or evidence. Thus it would be accurate to state that data that are subjective in sense *b* may be used to confer objectivity (sense *a*) on propositions.

that which is perceived by non-introspective or "external" observation, and is equally accessible to more than one observer.

Mr. Dewey asserts, without citing evidence from my paper, that I conceive the subjective (sense *b*) to refer to a "special order of Being," which constitutes "a certain sort of epistemological-metaphysical reality." From similar criticisms of introspection elsewhere in Mr. Dewey's writings, I presume that he is imputing to me something like a Cartesian dualism of mental and material substance. My distinction, however, was quite neutral with regard to metaphysical assumptions, and if any epistemological tenets are involved they are not presuppositions of this view but consequences of it together with other premises.

The distinction was intended to be exclusively one of psychological procedure. It refers to the fact that each individual stands in a unique relation to certain aspects of his own experience, a relation which is not shared by other observers with regard to those aspects of that person's experience. "Introspection" was here used in the sense employed by the late Professor Mead when he said that psychology "does make use of introspection, in the sense that it looks within the experience of the individual for phenomena not dealt with in any other sciences—phenomena to which only the individual has experiential access."[4] It is such phenomena, or rather aspects of phenomena, which I call subjective in the psychological sense. I say aspects of phenomena because I agree with Mead and with Mr. Dewey himself that the ultimate unit of conduct is most usefully conceived as the total act, or process, or event, and I hold that this is adequately treated only in terms of a total situation involving factors that are both subjective and objective in sense *b*.

Examples of aspects of events which are subjective in this sense are muscular sensations, thoughts which are not uttered or enacted, and feelings or "affective" tones. Both the occurrence and the quality of these aspects of phenomena can be directly observed only by the individual in whose organism they are occurring, though others may sometimes infer their occurrence from external symptoms, and consequently may infer their quality from associated "subjective" events which occur under similar conditions within their own experience. The sensory nerves directly concerned in perceiving subjective phenomena are the proprioceptors and interoceptors.[5]

The individual has no such unique vantage-point in observing

[4] *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. 4–5.

[5] Cf. R. B. Perry, *General Theory of Value*, pp. 270–271.

the "objective" aspects of events and acts (whether others' or his own), such as shapes, colors, and overt movements.[6] These are perceived by use of the exteroceptors, such as the optic and auditory nerves. Persons *B*, *C*, and *D* are on an equality with regard to observation of the color of person *A's* complexion, his dancing, and his spoken words, so far as bare difference of personal identity goes. *A* is even at a slight disadvantage in observing these aspects of his own behavior, although he can overcome this disadvantage to some extent by such means as the use of mirrors. *A* does, however, have a kind of access to the subjective aspects of these phenomena which is denied to *B*, *C*, and *D*, although the latter may be more nearly correct than *A* in their interpretation of the total act or situation. This is because the total situation includes both subjective and objective aspects, and both are relevant to the judgment on it as a totality. Furthermore, *A*, *B*, *C*, and *D* may erroneously interpret their psychologically objective data: hence objectivity in sense *b* and in sense *a* need not coincide.

Mr. Dewey states that my paper "offers no direct evidence for the existence of material that is private and inner and hence (by its very nature) accessible directly only to observation by a self which is single, exclusive, and non-public and non-social." I did not state nor imply that the self is "non-public and non-social." I do hold that it has its sequestered and idiosyncratic aspects. From the nature of the case, I can not offer to anyone else "direct" evidence for the occurrence of such aspects. For this, I must ask Mr. Dewey to examine his own joys, pains, and secret thoughts. If he should tell me that he does not have any such, nothing that I might say could refute him. However, as I understand his position from his other writings, he does not deny that experience has such aspects, but merely that they can possess evidential weight.

[6] The data or sensations involved in the perception of such phenomena are not necessarily objective in a common epistemological sense in which "primary" qualities are declared to be objective in contrast with subjective or "secondary" qualities, i.e., as asserting that primary qualities resemble certain corresponding properties of their objects, whereas secondary qualities are not thus iconic. This is a third distinct meaning of the antithesis, according to which shapes, e.g., are held to be objective and colors subjective. Furthermore, according to all epistemological schools except the naïve or direct realists, the *sensa* or *data* in the case of "objective" phenomena (sense *b*) are accessible only to the person to whose stream of consciousness they belong, and hence are "subjective" in still a fourth sense, which is partly psychological, partly epistemological. I have dealt with the relation between the second sense of the antithesis (sense *b*) and this fourth sense in another paper, "'Public' and 'Private' Factors in Valuation," which has been accepted for publication by *Ethics*. But here I am trying to avoid epistemological issues.

(2) *How immediate qualities are perceived.* From the above discussion it should be clear that I do not hold, as Mr. Dewey took me to be saying, that all qualities are perceived by introspection. "Subjective" qualities (sense *b*), which include affective tones, are apprehended directly by introspection, and "objective" qualities (sense *b*) are perceived by external or behavioristic observation. The two kinds of qualities are closely associated, and a relation of dependence may subsist between them, so that we may with some probability infer the existence of one from the other in particular cases. In the experience of a painting, for example, the affective tone is derived from, and felt as fused with, the design and color. But the two kinds of qualities are distinguishable even though, in most cases, they are not separable. And the two methods of observation collaborate. Since, as Mr. Dewey holds, values are affective-motor phenomena, affective qualities are of special importance to a theory of value. It is for this reason that in my previous paper I emphasized the rôle of introspection in perception of qualities.[7] In Mr. Dewey's writings on value we read much about the motor element in value experience, but little about the affective element.

(3) *"Public" and "private" as aspects of the "problematic situation."* The above definitions of "public" and "private" (for the sake of brevity I shall henceforth use these terms for "objective" and "subjective" respectively, in sense *b*), are, so far as I can see, compatible with analysis of valuation in terms of the *positive* features of Mr. Dewey's "problematic situation." (As I shall suggest below, the conception of the "problematic situation" becomes Procrustean when the attempt is made to fit all valuational and cognitive situations into it, to treat them all in terms of a "motor block.") Let us consider the situation "toothache" or "something-wrong-with-tooth." The "difficulty" which initiates the problem may be either publicly or privately detected. Usually in this case it is detected privately: I observe introspectively a "pain," and this suggests to me the hypothesis "I ought to visit a dentist," or—though with less initial probability—"I ought to have a cavity filled." The ache is not, as Mr. Dewey seems to hold, merely a "dubious" element in the situation, but, together with my previous knowledge of similar situations, it constitutes *prima facie* evidence for these value judgments. However, I seek further evidence to confirm them. This further evidence may consist of non-introspective observation to see if a brown speck can be found on my tooth. Such observation can be carried out by a

[7] See also my "Quality and Value," this JOURNAL, Vol. XL (1943), pp. 337–348.

number of other persons, including my dentist, or by myself with a mirror. If there is a conflict between the public and the private evidence, usually I trust the dentist's public evidence, and permit him to act accordingly. (I should assign superior evidential weight to the private evidence only if the dentist told me that there was nothing wrong with me, or that the pain was good in itself.) The difficulty is fully "resolved" only if the external manifestations of dental trouble disappear, and also if after an appropriate time the pain vanishes. I use the introspectively observed disappearance of the pain as an important part of the evidence that the situation has been resolved, and hence that the value judgment was correct. If the pain is still with me, I use it as initial evidence for a new hypothesis, namely, that the trouble was neuralgia and not decay. The two types of evidence, therefore, may reinforce or correct each other. Just why Mr. Dewey holds that the perception of the ache has no evidential weight is not clear to me.

Mr. Dewey's account of the problematic situation *abstracts from* the aspects of the situation which I have been considering; it ignores the alternative psychological perspectives from which observations can be made. So I do not know how to interpret his statement that the "immediate qualitative nature" of the situation is neither "subjective, nor objective, nor a relation of the two," if the terms in question are used in sense *b*. Nor do I see that a reference to the immediate quality of the situation is relevant if the terms are used in sense *a*. There is, I suppose, a sense in which the situation as a *gestalt* is perceived as having a unitary quality of its own. But our knowledge of the *total* quality, so far as we can achieve it, is not "immediate," but the result of construction and inference. We can, however, get perspectives upon this total quality by either external observation or introspection, or by both together; the idea of its quality as a whole is put together from the various partial perspectives and the immediate qualities which they supply.

In reading Mr. Dewey's account of mind, I have long been puzzled by what seems to me to be his *standpointless* psychology. I can see why he rejects both introspectionism and Watsonian behaviorism as adequate approaches by themselves, and also why he is dissatisfied with a parallelism which tries to put private and public data together mechanically. His emphasis on the total act is a useful one, and for the purpose of stating psychological laws it is often desirable to ignore the partial perspectives used in particular observations, and to speak in terms of "functions" and other behavioral concepts which cut across the distinction between

introspection and external observation. But why this should entail that a distinction between these two chief types of perspective is illegitimate for a descriptive analysis of actual psychological procedures is not clear.

(4) *Evidence "about" enjoyment and evidence "supplied by"* enjoyment. Mr. Dewey holds (*a*) that valuational propositions "concern" enjoyment, but denies (*b*) that such propositions may draw upon evidence "supplied by" observation of enjoyment. He interprets a statement of mine in such a way that he understands me to "identify" these two propositions, and he believes that my view rests upon this supposed "equivoke." I did not intend to assert a logical identity or equivalence between propositions (*a*) and (*b*), although I do hold that they are closely related materially.

When I predict that a certain experience will have value, I do not use introspection of *that* experience to obtain evidence. (Such a view would truly involve the "equivoke" in question.) *That* experience, by hypothesis, has not yet occurred, so I can not introspect it. I may, however, found my prediction in part on introspection of my present *anticipation* of the future experience, and on my *remembrance* of the affective qualities of similar experiences in the past. This view is based, not upon any deductive argument, but upon my empirical analysis of what I—and other persons—actually *do* when making decisions in such matters. If I predict that the experience of a Beethoven concerto, or a baseball game between the Dodgers and the Reds, will bring me "satisfaction" or "enjoyment" and hence value, it is in part because I remember that similar occasions in the past have been accompanied by enjoyment, and because I discover introspectively that my imaginative rehearsal of the probable experience ahead of me is now accompanied by relish. Such predictions have shown themselves to be sufficiently reliable that I continue to use this type of evidence, with discrimination and in conjunction with other kinds. Of course memory and anticipation are fallible with respect to affective qualities, and hence the private evidence is not conclusive. But neither, according to empiricism, is any other kind of evidence conclusive.

Mr. Dewey's second argument against the evidential function of introspectively obtained evidence is that this is incompatible with my view that ethical judgments are predictive in character,[8]

[8] I do not hold that *all* judgments of value are predictive in the sense that they refer to or are "about" a future event; in the earlier paper I took this position only with regard to a certain type of ethical judgment. Nor do I

that they take into account "the connection of a satisfaction with a system of interests, involving the future and a comparison of alternative acts with respect to their integrative function." That there should be such an incompatibility I do not see, and Mr. Dewey offers no reasons for this view. My decision in such a case as the concert or the baseball game takes account of public factors—the state of my bank account, the demands of other interests beside my musical or sporting interests upon my time, and the fitness of a soloist or a star pitcher—as well as private factors; both may be used for the purposes of prediction. If such public evidence excludes private evidence of the kind that has been mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the burden of proof that this is so rests upon Mr. Dewey. He should show this by analysis of concrete instances of such experiences and not by deduction from general assumptions concerning empirical method. For it is precisely the adequacy of these assumptions that is in question.

If we had at the present time an adequate doctrine of the logical syntax of empirical knowledge, I believe that the above analysis of valuation could be fitted into it, with resulting clarification of the whole field. Much of the controversy over theory of value among empiricists in recent years has sprung from the failure to recognize that there are many different types of value situations, and consequently that there is a great variety of kinds of "value judgments," with extremely various logical structures. The discussion of value theory by Mr. Dewey, R. B. Perry, and the late D. W. Prall, carried on intensively in this JOURNAL between 1914 and 1925, and prolonged by more or less desultory firing between Dewey and Perry since then, will illustrate the point. Thus Mr. Dewey in the course of that discussion wrote: ". . . The articles of mine which Mr. Prall criticized were not concerned with the nature of value, either the quality or the things having the quality, but with the nature of valuation as a judgment. . . . It happens that Mr. Prall is interested in his writings in value, while my interest was logical—that is, was in a certain type of judgment."[9] Perhaps it is because he has recognized the oddity of trying to construct a theory of "valuation" without at the same time offering a theory of "value" that Mr. Dewey on several later occasions has made at least casual attempts to define the latter concept. Thus, in his most recent article, he states that he holds that "qualitative 'enjoyment,' 'satisfaction,' " is "the *entire* material" that a valuation judgment is about. But he goes on to say that enjoy-

believe that such judgments depend exclusively upon evidence to be obtained in the future.

[9] This JOURNAL, Vol. XX (1923), p. 619.

ment is equated with value here only in a "figurative" sense; that enjoyment is properly called a value only "with reference to being potentially the material for an evaluative judgment, or in connection with events still to occur." Now here, as in his earlier discussion of the subject, Mr. Dewey has been concerned only with those types of judgment which he calls judgments of practice, and which seek to determine a particular future course of action in the presence of a "difficulty" or motor block. Here the judgment or reflection does create or modify the value involved. On the other hand, Prall, Perry, and most other empirical writers on value start from a simpler type of judgment asserting "valuable" as a predicate, and take this as the archetypal value judgment.

Now I should like to suggest that it is linguistically naïve to continue to dispute about *the* meaning of value, or the characteristics of *the* value judgment. If we should attempt to construct a logical syntax of valuation, we should have to take into account a number of different types of judgments that have been called value judgments. Among these is what might be called an elementary judgment of intrinsic value. The scheme for such a judgment is "x is intrinsically valuable to person A at time t (or in situation m)," and this is equivalent to "A enjoys x at time t (etc.)." This is one common meaning of "valuable"; propositions of this type are true or false and therefore significant, and their verification rests on observation. The label "*elementary* judgments of intrinsic value" is not intended to suggest that such judgments are logically atomic, although they are the simplest propositions which make explicit the three terms—an object, an organism, and a situation—to which a value is relative. The evidence upon which such judgments rest is reported by still simpler propositions analogous to Carnap's "protocol sentences" or, better, Russell's "basic propositions."[10] Some of these simpler propositions are usually based upon introspection, others on external observation. A himself takes into account observations formulable as "Enjoyment now," or "This is enjoyed." Other persons use such indirect evidence as "A looks happy" or "A says he likes this." Both A and the others, furthermore, use public evidence of the type involved in time determination or in description of the other objective factors of the situation.

Another fundamental type of value judgment would be "x has instrumental value in situation m," and this when expanded is equivalent to "x in situation m has such properties that it is capable of promoting intrinsic value y for A in situation n." (Or,

[10] *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, chapters X, XI.

in many cases, "x will promote the removal or avoidance of disvalue z. . . .") Likewise, there are elementary judgments of comparative value, either intrinsic or instrumental. Thus "x has more simple intrinsic value than y for A . . ." would mean "x gives A more enjoyment than does y. . . ." (The definition of "more enjoyment" here is not easy.)

Ethical and esthetic judgments each include a number of subspecies, and are always more complex than the judgments hitherto discussed. In one of the commonest types of esthetic judgment, which we may call the critical judgment, "x has esthetic value" means "x would give perceptual enjoyment to anyone sharing cultural tradition k who was trained to discriminate properties a, b, and c of x." In a common type of ethical judgment, "A ought to do act x" means "x will produce more integration of interests, together with resulting satisfaction, for A and the other persons affected than will any feasible alternative." An adequate treatment of the logical structure of such ethical propositions would show that they in turn rest upon elementary propositions both of simple intrinsic and of simple instrumental value, and perhaps also on esthetic judgments of several types. All these types of judgment would go back for their evidential support to protocol sentences or basic propositions recording observations, introspective or external, and hence would be empirical.

In conclusion, I should like to say a word about Mr. Dewey's identification of "neo-empiricist" or "scientific" method with the instrumentalist position. Empiricism, as I understand the term, is the view that all existential propositions derive their probability from observation. It holds that laws and other complex propositions in any field are obtained by observation, hypothesis, deductive prediction, and verification. Exponents of scientific method have at various times made two further assumptions derived from the study of the methods of the physical sciences: (a) that science must be metric, that it can deal only with quantitative aspects of the subject-matter; (b) that only "public" evidence is admissible. Mr. Dewey rejects the first of these assumptions as essential to empirical or scientific method in the broad sense. What I am suggesting is that instrumentalism and neo-positivism should reexamine the second of these assumptions also. If it should prove too restricting to enable us to deal properly with values, then empiricism as a general doctrine of method can be preserved only by rejecting the assumption. But if empiricism continues to be defended in such a way as to exclude the affective evidence that most men take into account in making value judgments, then the result will be to aggravate that "new failure of nerve" of which

Mr. Dewey has written elsewhere, and to turn many of those who are especially concerned with values away from the promising but incomplete contemporary versions of empiricism, to find refuge in some form of intuitionism or apriorism or authoritarianism.

PHILIP BLAIR RICE

KENYON COLLEGE

FURTHER AS TO VALUATION AS JUDGMENT[1]

I AM grateful to Mr. Rice for giving me further opportunity to clear up points in my view which I have failed to make sufficiently clear in the past. I shall in my present attempt confine myself to two leading theses put forth by Mr. Rice. One of them is that there are certain events which are intrinsically of such a nature that they can be observed only "introspectively," or by the single person or self in whom they occur, such events being so "sequestered and idiosyncratic" as to be private and, psychologically, "subjective." The second proposition is that in spite of their subjective intrinsic nature, they are capable of being used as evidence in the case of judgments of value along with facts of a public and "objective" nature, thus being logically "objective" although subjective in existence.[2]

I

The first of these two propositions concerns a question of fact. The fact involved is of such a fundamental nature that it has no more bearing upon or connection with the logical question of the evidence that validity supports judgments of valuation than it has with a multitude of other philosophic questions. I shall discuss it, then, *as* a question of fact, noting, however, that in Mr. Rice's

[1] The present paper is called out by the article of Professor Rice on *Types of Value Judgment*, this JOURNAL, Vol. XL (1943), pp. 533–543. I add here the remark that while I occasionally use the words "valuation judgments," I regard the phrase as pleonastic, *valuation* being judgment. (*Valuing*, as I pointed out long ago, is an ambiguous word standing both for judgment or evaluation and for direct liking, cherishing, relishing, holding dear, etc.) Since Mr. Rice in his present paper attributes to me an identification of what I called *neo*-empiricism—to distinguish it from traditional sensationalist empiricism—and scientific method with "instrumentalism," I also add the remark that the only identification I made was—and is—with the "hypothetico-inductive method."

[2] There is a third point in Mr. Rice's paper which, apparently, gives its caption to his article. It is sufficiently independent of the points just mentioned to merit consideration on its own account and, accordingly, is not touched upon in this reply.

view the fact, as he interprets it, plays an important part in judgments about "values." Mr. Rice holds that such events as "shapes, colors, overt movements" have qualities which are open to observation on equal terms by a number of observers, and hence are public and "objective" in their mode of existence. In contrast with such events, stand events such as "muscular sensations," thoughts not uttered or enacted, feelings having affective tone, etc. The latter can be observed only by a single person, or "introspectively," and hence are private, subjective. It is expressly held that "both the occurrence and the quality of these events can be directly observed only by the individual in whose organism they are occurring." Physiologically, they are said to be conditioned by proprioceptors and interoceptors, while events of a public and "objective" nature are conditioned by exteroceptors.

There is one difficulty in discussing this question of fact. The kind of event whose character is in dispute can not, by definition, be had by any two observers in common, and hence not by Mr. Rice and myself. Mr. Rice accordingly refers me, quite logically, to "my own" (exclusively my own) "joys, pains, and secret thoughts" for evidence of the existence of privately observed events. Now the bald statement that while I recognize the existence of such events as Mr. Rice gives examples of, I do *not* find them to be "private" or inner as observed and known, does not carry discussion far; it seems rather to leave it at a dead end.

The matter at issue may, however, be approached indirectly. Mr. Rice objects to my characterizing his position as "epistemological-metaphysical." I gave no reasons for that characterization. For I did not intend it to apply in any invidious way to Mr. Rice's view. On the contrary, I intended it to apply to a traditional and still generally accepted doctrine which originated and developed in modern epistemological discussions, and which is "metaphysical" in the sense that it has to do with the inherent nature of two kinds or orders of existence. Since Mr. Rice accepts and promulgates the view, if I understand him aright, that there are two such orders, one psychological and "individual," the other not, I used the characterization in question.[3]

[3] This matter is somewhat complicated in Mr. Rice's last paper by the fact that he freely refers to "subjective" and "objective" as *aspects;* aspects it would seem of "experience," which is taken to have two sides or faces, *x*, one private and one public. I should still regard this view as "metaphysical" in the sense of involving generalizations of the highest degree of generality about the nature of what exists. In any case, since I can not suppose that Mr. Rice is hedging in using the word "aspects," the word seems to need explanation. Mr. Rice's discussion of "muscular sensations,

In any case, I wish to repeat my expression of gratitude to Mr. Rice for giving me an opportunity to state my position on this matter as explicitly as possible, since, as I remarked in my earlier article, failure to grasp my actual view seems to account for misapprehension of many points in my general philosophical theory. In this restatement of my view, I begin by stating the conclusion I have arrived at. It is as follows: The undeniable *centering* of the events which are the more immediate condition of the occurrence of events in the way of observation and of knowledge generally, within a particular organism, say that of John Smith, has been taken as proof that the resulting *observation* is itself "individual." I believe further that this conversion of a condition of the occurrence of an event into an inherent and intrinsic property of the event itself (that of observation) is not due to anything in the facts, but is derived from the holdover of an earlier doctrine, of pre-scientific and largely theological origin, of an individual soul as the knower—even though the "soul" part has been thinned down into "mind," "consciousness," or even that supposedly scientific *Ersatz,* the brain of a single organism.

I do not deny, in other words, that the immediate or last conditions of the *occurrence* of a pain, say of a toothache, and the immediate and last conditions of the occurrence of an event in the way of knowing a given event *as* a toothache, are *centered* in particular organic bodies. But I do deny that causal conditions of the *occurrence* of an event are *ipso facto* qualities or traits of the event. I hold that they are extrinsic to the event itself although strictly relevant to its occurrence. And I also hold that while the temporally and spatially terminal conditions of an observation are *centered* in a particular organism, they are not *located* under the skin of the organism. For events outside the skin as well as under it are directly involved in the production of either a pain or an observation of it *as* pain.

I begin with the last point. In making a distinction between what I have called the *centering* of an event and its *location,* I have nothing recondite in mind. Every event that takes place has a certain extensive durational and spatial spread, as long and as wide as all the interacting conditions involved. Environmental conditions are surely as much a part of the occurrence of a toothache as are organic conditions; to *know* the event *as* the toothache it actually is depends on knowledge of the former. The sole difference that exists between environmental conditions and organic conditions is that the former occupy a relatively initial place and

secret thoughts, feelings of affective tone," seems to treat them as events on their own account.

the latter a relatively terminal position in the series of occurrences forming a single total event. The operative presence of both environing and organic conditions, on equal terms, is found in events Mr. Rice terms "private" as it is in those he calls "public." The notion that language in the cases when it is not heard by others (is not "uttered or enacted") is on that account private in origin, occurrence, and quality is so extreme that it is hard for me to believe that it is held by any except extreme solipsists. Moreover, if the fact that certain occurrences center in a particular organism justifies the conclusion that the event thus conditioned is private and "subjective," the doctrine that colors and overt movements *as perceived* are also private seems logically to follow. Mr. Rice has corrected my impression that he holds qualities *as such* to be "subjective." But I think the logic of the matter as far as concerns the grounds for holding that *all* qualities are subjective is with those who make no difference between perceived colors and perceived pains.

As far as the logic of the matter is concerned, why not hold that *all events* have an exclusive, sequestered, private, self-centered aspect? A fire, for example, does not occur at large. It takes place in a particular house and may be confined to a single house: that is, according to the logic employed in behalf of the subjectivistic doctrine, it is "individual." All, except confirmed pan-psychists, who hold that this fact does not render the fire subjective while a similar fact causes the perception of a toothache to be private, seem to have a responsibility for indicating the difference in the two cases—pan-psychists not having that responsibility because they use the same logic all the way through.

Finally and most conclusively, the qualified and restricted relative sense in which a pain-event, say, may properly be said to be *centered,* with respect to its occurrence, in a particular organism has nothing to do with *observational knowledge* of it *as* pain and *as* the pain of a toothache. The fact that under ordinary conditions some one else can see "my own" teeth much more readily than I can, will not, I suppose, be taken to prove that after all what is seen by him belongs to him in a "private" way. Nor will the fact that I can not, under ordinary conditions, see the back of my own head be taken to militate against the fact that, after all, it is the back of "my own" head that is involved. Nor will the fact that from where I now sit I can observe certain things not observable by others from the positions they now occupy be taken as evidence that the things in question are private and subjective.

The examples I have chosen will, presumably, call out the retort that the conditions of perception and non-perception in the cases

cited are wholly extrinsic, not affecting the nature or quality of the things perceived. Exactly so. My position is that the causes why a toothache is "felt" directly by one and not by another human being are of a similar extrinsic kind, not at all affecting the observed nature of the event as pain and as pain of a toothache. We are brought back to the matter of the distinction between conditions for the occurrence of a given event and the observed qualities of that event.

We have to *learn* to see, hear, and to feel when "feeling" is taken to mean an identification and demarcation of an event as having the qualities that define it as a kind of event—as happens in the case of identifying and distinguishing an event as pain and as toothache. It is to be hoped, though not too confidently asserted, that, in another generation or so, facts ascertained in biology, anthropology, and other sciences will displace the influence now exerted upon theories of observation and knowledge by doctrines that were framed before the sciences attained anything approaching their present estate. As things now stand, much that still passes as sound psychological knowledge is the result of the seeping in of doctrines it was "natural" enough to hold in earlier conditions, but which are now scientifically nullified.

In recurring to the confusion of events which, in a relative and restricted sense, are conditions of the occurrence of an event with the properties of that event as observed, I mentioned that under ordinary circumstances we do not perceive our own teeth or the backs of our own heads. Nevertheless it is easily "done with mirrors." In principle, though not in practical ease, the same thing holds in the case of a toothache. In case a certain grafting of the proprioceptor nerve-tissues of two organisms could be successfully effected (and events as strange as this have actually taken place) there would exist the conditions for observation on equal terms by different observers—the criterion for that which is said to be "public."

And in connection with the other point, that perception and observation are affairs of identifying and distinguishing an event as *such-and-such,* Mr. Rice evinces a sound sense of fact in his admission that a perception based upon knowledge of the public kind—as in the case of observation by a dentist—is more likely to be valid than the observation of one with less technical knowledge, even though the conditions of occurrence of what is observed happen to center in the organism of the latter. In fact this admission on the part of Mr. Rice comes so close to taking the view I have been presenting that the matter might be left there.

I add, however, that I believe detailed examination of the case

represented by "muscular sensations" would prove especially instructive. At what time and under what circumstances was it that the existence of qualities, which, on the physiological side, are mediated by changes of the nervous tissues in muscular structures, was first detected? I believe that the facts of the case would show that instead of their presence being an affair of direct and easy observation on the part of the one in whose organism the immediately conditioning events take place, it was an affair, at the outset, of a conclusion reached by knowledge of other facts —a hypothetical conclusion which was then tested by setting up special conditions (in principle like the use of a mirror in perceiving the back of one's own head) that enabled direct observation to be made.

I add also that examination of the case of language, whether uttered or "secret," would supply, in my judgment, evidence that is all but crucial. That language is something *learned*, and learned under social or public conditions, hardly needs argument. If we eliminate the influence exerted by traditional doctrines owing their present currency to the force of tradition rather than to scientifically ascertained facts, we shall, I believe, have no difficulty in accepting the view that instead of their first being "thoughts" which are private and which become public by being clothed externally in language, it is by language, by communication, that events otherwise dumb become possessed of "meanings" which, when they are studied in a cut-off way, are called "thoughts." I can imagine that this reference to language deciding the meanings *"pain, toothache"* will seem irrelevant to Mr. Rice. The issue is too large to argue at length here. But the question at issue is accessibility to *observation*. To defend the position of irrelevancy it would be necessary to show that observation of an event as *such-and-such* is possible without use of characteristics determined publicly in language, and/or that conditions without which an event can not occur are not relevant to its characterization.[4]

[4] Dr. Rice was kind enough to send me a copy of his rejoinder, published in the same issue, to this article. Accordingly I append a few brief comments bearing upon the foregoing section. (1) I began the present article by saying that the first thesis of Mr. Rice which I should criticize is the view of the *"intrinsic,"* and "unique," inaccessibility of certain events to public (i.e., dual or plural) observation. For I understood Mr. Rice to hold to the *intrinsic* character of the inaccessibility of certain events to dual observation. And I do not find in his rejoinder any disavowal of this position. It is retracted, however, if I understand him, in one case, a case usually cited as typical, that of the pain of a toothache. But, if I understand him, there is still not the retraction of the view of *intrinsic* inaccessibility which seems to

II

The previous section concerns a matter of fact. While the conclusion reached affects the theory of valuation, it affects it only in the way in which it bears upon discussion of any philosophic topic. Its discussion takes up as much space as is given it in the present paper because the question raised and the criticisms made in previous articles seem to make it necessary. The conclusion I have reached appears at first sight to have left, as far as I am concerned, the question having to do with evidence for valuation in a total *impasse*. For if there are no "subjective" events of the kind indicated, then of course subjective events are not evidential with respect either to valuation or anything else.

The actual question, with respect to valuations, however, is not disposed of in this rather cavalier manner. I do not deny the existence of the kind of *subject-matter* which is called private and inner by Mr. Rice. On the contrary, we agree that this kind of material (whether subjective or objective) is that which valuations are about or concern. The question as to the evidential status for judgment of this material is accordingly still before us. The logical issue as distinct from that of fact needs discussion. Moreover, in his last article Mr. Rice has given illustrations that help define the issue.

follow. (2) My point was that cases like this one proved that the number of observers to whom a given event is observable is an *extrinsic* matter, just as with the fact that *under present conditions* I am the only observer to whom events in the room where I am now writing are "accessible." (3) I was so far from attributing to Mr. Rice the view that *he* bases *his* distinction between public and private events upon the causal conditions of their occurrence," that I pointed out that his failure to do so was a case of his regarding inaccessibility under specifiable conditions of time and place as *intrinsic* and absolute—if I understand the words "intrinsic" and "unique" correctly. (4) Hence, instead of taking the position that "external relations can not be used as the 'defining properties' of events" (and of classes of events), my argument is that spatial-temporal *differences* in such "external relations" make the entire difference between the events and classes of events set *intrinsically* apart by Mr. Rice. So that the distinction is as *extrinsic* as is my inability to see, under *usual* space-time conditions, the back of my own head. (5) I am not sure whether Mr. Rice intended to attribute to me the view that I base the distinction between the classes of events in question "on their centering in the organism." But to avoid the possibility of misunderstanding, I add that I do not. On the contrary, my point is that *all* events in the way of observations are *centered* in an organism, while *all* events, those Mr. Rice calls private as well as those he calls public, extend, spatially and temporally, far beyond the skin of the organism in which they come to a head. This consideration adds to the relevancy of reference to language in the matter of observation in which an event is characterized as *such-and-such*.

Let me begin, then, by repeating as emphatically as possible that the occurrence of events in the way of prizing, cherishing, admiring, relishing, enjoying, is not in question. Nor is their primary importance for human life in any way depreciated; the events are what make life worth having. Nor is it held that they must be taken out of their qualitative immediacy and be subjected to judgment. On the contrary, my thesis, as respects valuation, is that only when conditions arise that cause doubt to arise as to their value (not their occurrence) are they judged. There is no single word that covers the entire range of events of the kind mentioned. It is convenient to use a single word to save constant repetition of things admired, enjoyed, liked, held dear, relished, cherished; this list being far from covering their entire range. I shall use the word "the enjoyeds." I use that term rather than "enjoyments" because it emphasizes the fact that actual events are involved; we do not enjoy enjoyments, but persons, scenes, deeds, works of art, friends, conversations with them, and ball games and concertos, to mention Mr. Rice's illustrations.

In his original article, Mr. Rice criticized my view that valuation-judgments proceed by placing the enjoyeds in the context (provided of course by inquiry) of conditions that produce them and consequences that result from them. Mr. Rice did not deny that this operation furnishes evidence, but charged me with neglecting the evidence which is supplied by the very occurrence of the enjoyeds. In fact he even went so far as to imply that I paid no attention to their occurrence in my pre-occupation with conditions and consequences. My reply was that so far from neglecting this fact, my theory holds that such are the events the *subject-matter* of valuations; but that since their unsettled or dubious state *qua* value is precisely that which calls out judgment, it is an equivoke to treat them, *in their bare occurrence,* as capable of providing evidence.

In his present reply, Mr. Rice cites the case of a toothache, saying that its immediately dis-enjoyed qualities may, and often do, furnish part of the evidence for the judgment of value: " 'I ought to visit a dentist,' or—though with less initial probability—'I ought to have a cavity filled.' " He continues "The ache is not, as Mr. Dewey seems to hold, merely a 'dubious' element in the situation, but, together with my previous knowledge of similar situations, it constitutes *prima facie* evidence for these value judgments." I do not know just what Mr. Rice has in mind by saying that I seem to hold that the ache is "merely a dubious element in the situation." I do not, however, suppose that he means to impute to me the view that its existence is in doubt. So I repeat

that *if* there is a pause for valuation-judgment, it is because there is some doubt, in the total situation, of just what it indicates as to what it is better to do; what *should* or ought to be done. And I insert the *if* because it is by no means necessary that judgment intervene. One having the ache may make it a rule to visit a dentist; the event in question then operates as a direct stimulus—and unfortunately many persons react just by standing an ache until it ceases.

The nub of Mr. Rice's position, however, is found in the sentence containing the phrase "together with," in saying that the qualities of the ache provide, *along with previous knowledge,* evidence. Now there is a meaning of the words "together with" in which the statement made seems just as sensible and evident to me as it does to Mr. Rice. But this meaning is just not that which Mr. Rice gives the words. "Together with" is an ambiguous phrase. Mr. Rice gives it the meaning his own theory requires; that it is itself evidence as far as it goes, evidence which is then *added on* to evidence supplied by previous knowledge of similar situation. My understanding of the words is that which, I believe, would occur to one independent of any theory. When the event of an enjoyed is judged with respect to estimating its value, its occurrence *qua* value is passed upon by means of taking it out of its isolated occurrence and bringing it into connection with the other facts, primarily those supplied by memory-knowledge of what has happened in the past in similar situations. By being viewed "together with" such facts, judgment is formed as to what the event indicates to be better or as to what should be. From my point of view, then, the meaning Mr. Rice gives the phrase repeats the equivoke with which he was charged in my previous article.

Mr. Rice's sense for fact leads him, even so, to qualify the evidential status of the event; he calls it "*prima facie* evidence," and goes on to speak of the need of "further evidence" being sought for to confirm (or, I suppose, perhaps to refute) evidence that is only *prima facie.* My point is that this further evidence is "together with" the enjoyed in question in precisely the same sense in which the knowledge of previous situations is together with it: the means of determining a valuation of it.

Mr. Rice gives some further examples of the same general type, referring to valuations regarding events to happen in the future. He says in the case of a judgment that it will be enjoyable to go to a Beethoven concerto or a ball game between the Dodgers and the Reds, "it is in part because I remember that similar occasions in the past have been accompanied by enjoyment, and because I

discover introspectively that my imaginative rehearsal of the probable experience ahead of me is now accompanied by relish." No one can doubt that evidence supplied by the fact that similar events in the past have proved enjoyable is good evidence of the fact that, under like conditions, the same sort of event will be enjoyed in the future. Instead of proving Mr. Rice's contention that the present relish of the prospect is *added* evidence it goes to show that evidence provided by *other* events is summoned to pass upon the quality *qua* value, of the relish in question. I repeat that I don't hold that valuation-judgment *must* intervene. One may react directly by going to the ball-park or the concert-hall. Unless perchance Mr. Rice holds that every case of an enjoyed is, *ipso facto,* also a case of occurrence of a valuation-judgment, what are the conditions which according to him, evoke judgment of an enjoyed event in case there is no doubt as to its status *qua* value?

But the reader can analyze for himself the examples cited by Mr. Rice, and decide whether they are in fact instances that what is directly enjoyed are cases of providing additional, even *prima facie,* evidence in *judgments* regarding value, or whether the evidence to which it is said to be *added* is in fact that which decides the *value* of an enjoyed event. And if we were engaged merely in controversy and not in discussion of an issue, I would add that introduction of the *phrase prima facie* is itself a sufficient indication that the latter of the two alternatives describes the facts of the case.

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FEELINGS AS EVIDENCE

I

AS I read his latest article,[1] Professor Dewey does not deny that it is possible to distinguish between the *class of events or properties* that I call private—affective qualities, secret thoughts, etc.—and the class that I call public—shapes and movements of external bodies, whatever properties of objects give rise to our perceptions of colors, etc.[2] What he holds is that "public" and

[1] "Further as to Valuation as Judgment," this JOURNAL, Vol. XL (1943), pp. 543–552.

[2] Mr. Dewey's point that "colors and overt movements as perceived are also private" by my criterion does not affect the point in dispute. I have not claimed that public properties or events are *directly* accessible to inspection, like private events; what I have asserted is that a public event is *equally* accessible to the observation of plural observers, whereas there is a sense in

"private" are illegitimate or misleading as determining functions for these classes, and, more important, that only a "qualified and restricted relative distinction" can be made between these two classes of events, based not on their accessibility to observation but on their "centering" in an organism and on the earlier or later occurrence of organic conditions in their production.

The greater part of his criticism of me on this point seems to rest on a misunderstanding. For I am not, as he asserts, basing my distinction between public and private events on the "causal conditions" of their occurrence. Such is his practice rather than mine. My distinction is not one of causal or temporal sequence but of unique accessibility or multiple accessibility. A one-one relation, introspection, holds between an observer and a private event; a many-one relation, external observation, may hold between observers and a public event. These *fundamenta divisionis* do not refer to the origin of such events but to their observability—which is a consequence and not a causal antecedent of their existence, for events must exist before they can be observed.

Mr. Dewey's own criteria for distinguishing between these classes of events may be perfectly legitimate (although I believe this could be argued), and, for certain purposes, more useful than mine. But I do not see that he has shown that my distinction is either (*a*) without basis in fact, or (*b*) in violation of legitimate semiotical or definitional procedures.

(*a*) The chief passage where Mr. Dewey meets me on my own ground, and speaks in terms of single or plural accessibility, is that in which he suggests that it is not "in principle" impossible that the proprioceptor or interoceptor nerve tissues of two organisms should be grafted to each other. I agree with this, and also with the conclusion that if such an operation were performed, the toothache of one of these synthetic Siamese twins would cease to be private to him, by my definition. But this would not render meaningless or useless my sense of "private"; for the toothaches of people who were not neural Siamese twins would still be uniquely accessible to them. I am not arguing that toothaches are *intrinsically* or *unalterably* private, but that their affective qualities are *de facto* private, as matters now stand. We may say that the moon is inaccessible to us without denying that a Jules Verne moon rocket may some day be devised. If the time comes when, in some

which a private event is accessible only to a single observer. With private events the accessibility is direct; with public events it is indirect, i.e., mediated by perceptual signs or "sensa." The sensa themselves of course are private to each observer, unless naïve realism is true. Cf. footnote 6 of my "Types of Value Judgments," p. 536.

form of super-totalitarianism, everybody's proprioceptors and interoceptors will have been plugged into everybody else's, then the term "private" as defined will cease to have denotation. Until then it will have denotation. This is not, as Mr. Dewey intimates, a theological fantasy of mine but a plain matter of fact.

(*b*) We agree, then, that the privacy of a given event is mutable, at least in principle, and therefore an external relation. Where I take issue is with Mr. Dewey's view that external relations can not be used as "defining properties" of events, if that means for him, as it clearly does in this discussion, that extrinsic relations can not be used as grounds for *distinguishing between classes of events*. The relation "being present on Main Street at 10:30 A.M. today" is an external relation of those to whom it applies, yet if a bomb had been thrown at that time this relation might serve a very useful purpose in distinguishing the class of those who could be suspected as assassins from the class of those who could not. Mr. Dewey's view of classification here seems to be not that of neo-empiricist logic, but the Aristotelian position that only "essences" or "intrinsic" properties can be used as *fundamenta divisionis*. Can he successfully defend the Aristotelian view? If not, he will have to admit that, so far as its being an external relation goes, unique accessibility can serve to determine a class.

Mr. Dewey's other main point in Part I of his paper is that thoroughgoing knowledge of private events uses language, which is a social product, and that a good deal of public or behavioristic experimentation—e.g., upon kinesthetic phenomena—is required to call our attention to, and enable us to study the causes of, such private aspects of these phenomena as muscular "sensations." I believe that such points are a useful corrective to an exclusively introspectionist psychology, which I would not try to uphold. I am arguing against an exclusively behaviorist psychology. The psychology I am defending does not hold that all the factors involved in an inquiry which uses introspection, or in an event known by introspection, are "private in origin, occurrence, and quality." Social factors may have conditioned the occurrence and quality, as well as the origin, of private events. Introspection may lead to communication of their occurrence and quality, and therein make use of language which is the product of a long social process and whose utterance involves overt movements. But why then should we call the whole process public or private without qualification, as Mr. Dewey wishes to do? The matter can be described accurately, and with greater nicety, by saying that some factors and phases of the process are private and others are public. An event may be conditioned by social factors and capable of being

reported intersubjectively, and still be private in its accessibility to direct inspection. The publicity of certain phases of the "knowing" (when it has public phases) does not cancel the privacy of the "having."

II

I don't know why the view is imputed to me that "enjoyeds" are "in their bare occurrence evidential," nor do I know what this could mean. Of course enjoyeds are not evidential until they are actually used as evidence—unless we say that they are *potentially* evidential because of their capacity for being so used, which is a tautology. A given enjoyed may or may not be used as evidence, and consequently evidential function is an external relation. When enjoyeds do serve as evidence, the evidence may be used by one individual to shape his own action while keeping the evidence to himself, or he may "make it public." This latter expression, however, is figurative. We don't bare our feelings in their immediacy to public inspection—by plugging in others' proprioceptors—but the feelings remain private. What we do make public are certain linguistic and other signs which denote—and often connote—our feelings. When we "make public" our feelings they are not *literally* "taken out of their qualitative immediacy and subjected to judgment." On the contrary, they *remain* in their qualitative immediacy *and* are subjected to judgment. Why an "either-or" here rather than a "both-and"? The feelings are not literally transferred in their numerical identity from one person's experience to another's. This is why it is so difficult to "share" another's feelings.

The refusal to acknowledge that feelings constitute or supply evidence may spring from the ambiguity of the term "evidence." In a law court, evidence often includes both *testimony* (of witnesses) and *exhibits* (the murder weapon, etc.). Mr. Dewey may be using evidence in a more restricted sense which includes testimony or propositions, but not the events or occurrences which they report. Of course exhibits are not used as evidence till they are judged, but testimony too is evaluated. Among the "exhibits" for a value judgment are feelings and other private events, as well as public events (the fact that in a law court all exhibits are public does not affect the point of the analogy). All veridical testimony, like all empirical propositions, goes back to the observation of events or occurrences for *its* evidence. If private events can be observed or reported on, then it follows that some ultimate evidence is private, even though the intermediate evidence—i.e., the testimony or judgment—is public.

But the main issue between us, as Mr. Dewey says, is my assertion that valuation judgments not only "concern" enjoyments but can use evidence that is "supplied by" observation of enjoyments (whether we choose to call enjoyments private or not). He seems to be granting my whole point when he writes: "No one can doubt that evidence supplied by the fact that similar events in the past have proved enjoyable is sound evidence of the fact that, under like conditions, the same sort of event will be enjoyed in the future" (p. 552). For we normally have discovered that past events were enjoyable or enjoyed by consulting our feelings.

Now I should agree that in many types of value judgment doubt arises as to the *sufficiency* of evidence derived either from inspection of a memory of past enjoyments or inspection of a present relishing, and that we then proceed to investigate the "public" conditions. But in this case it seems to me that it is the evidence derived from the public conditions which is "added onto" the evidence supplied by feelings, and not *vice versa*. In any case, I don't see the importance of the question which kind of evidence is added to which, unless this implies that the additional evidence is superfluous. We may first have a desire for a certain kind of affective experience and then scrutinize the objective means of attaining it, or we may first contemplate a possible course of action and then try to determine the probable emotional reward to be gained from the action. It is not always the case that I first have a desire to go to the ball game and then see if I can raise the money to buy a ticket. There have been fortunate occasions when some one offered me a ticket, and then I asked myself whether I was in the mood for a game. This is, in any case, a psychological and not a logical problem. You can get 5 by adding 2 to 3 or by adding 3 to 2. And when we add the second this does not mean that we subtract the first.

The crucial question is whether the observations of our feelings supply evidence which remains on the final balance sheet which we may draw up of the *pros* and *cons* of an action. Mr. Dewey's view is that investigation of public conditions cancels or replaces the affective data as evidence. I don't see that experience bears this out. My final decision to go to a ball game may be based on all of the following propositions as evidence: (*a*) I have enjoyed ball games in the past, (*b*) I now relish the idea of going, (*c*) Some one offers me a ticket, (*d*) A certain pitcher is going to perform, (*e*) I don't have much work piled up on my desk. Propositions (*a*) and (*b*) not only concern enjoyments but are derived largely or wholly from observation of them; the other propositions concern matters of objective or public fact. But all five propositions are

relevant to my decision. I certainly should not decide to go to the ball game on the evidence of propositions (*c*), (*d*), and (*e*) without also having evidence of the kind stated by propositions (*a*) and (*b*). It follows that the affective evidence is not merely added evidence but indispensable evidence.

Mr. Dewey seems to attach some importance to the question whether "the relish attending anticipation of future events is itself *directly* evidential. . . ." (italics mine). I should say that the relish is direct evidence for proposition (*b*), "I now relish the idea of going to the game." It is indirect or non-immediate evidence for the final value judgment, "I should go to the game." But it is nevertheless evidence for this proposition, since the latter rests in part on proposition (*b*). If affective data are indirect evidence for a valuation judgment, then they are evidence. This was the point in dispute.

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BOOK NOTES

Religion of Tomorrow. JOHN ELOF BOODIN. New York: Philosophical Library. 1943. 189 pp. $2.50.

In this little volume of lay sermons Boodin expounds in simple, sermonic style the major ideas of his earlier and more systematic works. His system here gains in emotional expression and religious appeal. "We must respect the intuition which underlies orthodox Christianity; but we must strive to bring it into the light of day by expressing it in concepts which are part of our present thinking and social insight" (p. 76). In this irenic spirit Boodin reinterprets the faith of yesterday for the work of tomorrow.

He gives a brief exposition of his idea of God as creative energy and outlines his philosophy of creative evolution. But the emphasis in this volume falls on his plea for the cultivation of "sacramental communion" and on his belief that the power of love is greater than "realists" imagine. By "love" he means a more intensive and progressive form of Royce's "loyalty," manifesting itself "in the progressive historic mind" (p. 104). He suggests, less by argument than by poetry, that modern experience and education have led to a disillusionment in those faiths that build their theories of progress on forces apparently more natural and blind than love: and he tries, with considerable success, to represent love as a natural "blind" energy in virtue of which religious or cosmic idealism can rest secure.

H. W. S.

Principles of Behavior. An Introduction to Behavior Theory. CLARK L. HULL. (The Century Psychology Series.) New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Co. 1943. x + 422 pp. $4.00.

This book brings together experimental and theoretical analyses of learning and habit formation which have been made during the past third of a century, and presents in a systematic way fundamental principles of molar behavior which can be elicited from such studies. Sixteen primary principles together with a large number of corollaries are formulated, and are illustrated and supported by a variety of experimental, quantitative determinations.

Although Professor Hull believes that "all behavior, individual and social, moral and immoral, normal and psychopathic, is generated from the same primary laws" and that "the differences in the objective behavioral manifestations are due to the differing conditions under which habits are set up and function," the present book covers only a small fraction of the types of behavior he mentions. Moreover, some of his principles are simply rough empirical formulae, with only meager experimental and theoretical warrant, and in general the principles lack the unified coherence which primary principles in better established sciences possess; and Professor Hull frankly admits the "system" presented to be very tentative. None the less, the volume should prove of extraordinary interest to students of applied logic, and certainly merits their attention. It is written with an unusually mature methodological self-consciousness; and it distinguishes with unusual care between matters of public observation and matters of hypothetical inference, while at the same time it indicates the empirical grounds for accepting the latter. Professor Hull practices, and not only preaches, the virtue of clear formulation, and he notes that such formulations, even if incorrect, "will ultimately lead more quickly and easily to a correct formulation than will a pussyfooting statement which might be more difficult to convict of falsity." He is convinced that the successful systematic development of the behavioral sciences must wait upon the time when students of behavior become adept in interpreting their materials in terms of mathematical equations. But he does not conceal from his readers some of the difficulties which stand in the way of achieving this goal: "The so-called social sciences will no longer be a division of *belles lettres;* anthropomorphic intuition and a brilliant style, desirable as they are, will no longer suffice as in the days of William James and James Horton Cooley. . . . There will be encountered vituperative opposition from those who cannot or will not think in terms of mathematics, from those who prefer to have their scientific pictures artistically

out of focus, from those who are apprehensive of the ultimate exposure of certain personally cherished superstitions and magical practices, and from those who are associated with institutions whose vested interests may be fancied as endangered."

E. N.

Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Translated with notes by T. M. Knox. New York: Oxford University Press. 1942. xvi + 382 pp. $6.50.

The need for a more nearly adequate translation of that rich bed of ideas, Hegel's *Philosophy of Right,* has been great, and students of philosophy and political science owe a debt of gratitude for the painstaking, scholarly, and very much improved translation of this work by Professor Knox.[1] There is little question but that we have here a book that will be the standard English translation of this very German work.

No one can make Hegel's writings easy to understand. Even falsification through simplification is of no decisive help, and Professor Knox has not attempted to take advantage of such a delusive aid. While remaining as nearly literal as possible, he has, by careful and felicitious translation, given us a very readable text. In addition to the excellent translation, we are provided with a number of valuable aids for reading and studying the work. A discriminating set of notes has been provided to elucidate the more difficult concepts and passages, and, in the Foreword, the translator has adapted and amplified Hegel's own summary exposition of his key concepts which Hegel prefixed to his lectures on the history of philosophy. The notes in the Foreword treat specifically the troublesome terms, especially as they are rleated to and distinguished from one another, *Gedanke, Verstand, Vernunft, Begriff, Idee, Vorstellung,* and *an sich* and *für sich* (made the near equivalent of *δύναμις* and *ἐγέργεια* and translated as "implicit" and "explicit," the authors greatest departure from literal translation). The notes at the end of the text are not designed to serve as a full commentary, nor do they include much in the way of criticism. Though occasionally pedantic, they are mostly of real value in interpreting obscure paragraphs, in clarifying the precise opponents and ideas Hegel had in mind in his frequently allusive discussions, and in directing the reader to helpful cross references within and without the text. In the conviction that Hegel's own references are worth while, the translator has taken the trouble to give those references in terms of the best editions now available.

E. G.

[1] Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews and former fellow and tutor of Jesus College, Oxford.

NOTES AND NEWS

We regret to learn of the recent death in England of Miss Susan Stebbing, Professor of Philosophy at Bedford College for Women, London.

Bryn Mawr College announces the following series of public lectures by Mr. Bertrand Russell under the general title of "Postulates of Scientific Methods": October 8, Limitations of Deductive Logic; October 15, Probable Inference in Practice; October 19, Physics and Knowledge; October 26, Perception and Causality; October 29, Induction and Analogy.

Dr. Wing Tsit Chan, Professor of Chinese Culture at Dartmouth College, will be in residence at Bryn Mawr College for three weeks beginning October 16 and will give five public lectures on various neglected phases of Chinese art, religion, philosophy, and science.

Some years ago The London School of Economics acquired a substantial part of the papers of J. S. Mill, and made a preliminary survey of existing material with a view to the publication after the war of a new collection of his letters. A new collection of Mill's letters up to 1847 is already in a state of active preparation. Efforts are being made to trace as many of the existing autograph letters of Mill as possible, and the coöperation of private owners of such autograph letters is requested. The London School of Economics will appreciate any offers of the loan of such letters or communications of information which may help in tracing such letters. Communications should be addressed to The Chairman, Economic Research Division, London School of Economics, The Hostel, Peterhouse, Cambridge, England. Autograph letters should not be sent unless by registered mail.

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